Jeg er i gang med at laese denne bog af Carol Loomis:
Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything, 1966-2012
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/14461754-tap-dancing-to-work
Bogen er et sammendrag af artikler fra Fortune; 13 af dem skrevet af Warren Buffett. Den foerste af slagsen fra hans haand er artiklen:
"How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor"
Artiklen kan hentes her:
https://fortune.com/2011/06/12/buffett-how-inflation-swindles-the-equity-investor-fortune-classics-1977/
Artiklen er fra maj 1977. I artiklen optraeder foelgende paragraf:
"Must we really view that 12% equity coupon as immutable? Is there any law that says the corporate return on equity capital cannot adjust itself upward in response to a permanently higher average rate of inflation? There is no such law, of course. On the other hand, corporate America cannot increase earnings by desire or decree. To raise that return on equity, corporations would need at least one of the following: (1) an increase in turnover, i.e., in the ratio between sales and total assets employed in the business; (2) cheaper leverage; (3) more leverage; (4) lower income taxes; (5) wider operating margins on sales."
Det gjorde mig nysgerrig ift til at sammenligne med nutidens tal. Derfor har jeg plottet foelgende for S&P500 (jeg beklager, at jeg ikke kender alle ordene paa dansk):
0) ROE (egenkapital-forrentning)
En del hoejere end dengang; ~12% mod ~15,7%. Men hvorfor? Se plottene nedenfor.
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/ROE/sp500_ROE_sumTrue_2020-1.png
1) "an increase in turnover"; asset turnover
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/assetTurnover/sp500_assetTurnover_sumTrue_2020-1.png
2) "cheaper leverage"; renteudgifter ift gaeld
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/debtInterestRate/sp500_debtInterestRate_sumTrue_2020-1.png
I oevrigt naevner Buffett perifert/sporadisk forsynings-selskaberne i denne sammenhaeng, saa jeg plottede dem for sig:
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500_utilities/debtInterestRate/sp500_utilities_debtInterestRate_sumTrue_2020-1.png
3) "more leverage"; equity multiplier
"More leverage? American business already has fired many, if not most, of the more-leverage bullets once available to it. Proof of that proposition can be seen in some other Fortune 500 statistics: in the 20 years ending in 1975, stockholders' equity as a percentage of total assets declined for the 500 from 63% to just under 50%. In other words, each dollar of equity capital now is leveraged much more heavily than it used to be."
Nu er vi helt neede paa 33%. Equity multiplier er den reciprokke vaerdi; aktiver divideret med egenkapital.
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/equityMultiplier/sp500_equityMultiplier_sumTrue_2020-1.png
4) "lower income taxes"; jeg har ikke plottet den effektive skatteprocent, men vi ved alle, at satsen blev saenket fra 35% til 21% ifm Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Om det var en god ide paa lang sigt kan man saa vaere enig eller uenig i.
5) "wider operating margins on sales"
"Recent statistical evidence, furthermore, does not inspire confidence in the proposition that margins will widen in a period of inflation. In the decade ending in 1965, a period of relatively low inflation, the universe of manufacturing companies reported on quarterly by the Federal Trade Commission had an average annual pretax margin on sales of 8.6%. In the decade ending in 1975, the average margin was 8%. Margins were down, in other words, despite a very considerable increase in the inflation rate."
Margenerne er noget hoejere end dengang; sikkert som foelge af tilblivelsen af mange teknologi-virksomheder:
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/operatingMargin/sp500_operatingMargin_sumTrue_2020-1.png
Jeg har plottet for industri-virksomhederne alene:
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500_industrials/operatingMargin/sp500_industrials_operatingMargin_sumTrue_2020-1.png
Buffett naevner i artiklen book value:
"It is also true that in the real world investors in stocks don't usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book; usually, however, they've had to pay more than book, and when that happens there is further pressure on that 12%."
Book value har nok mindre relevans i dag end dengang, men K/I for S&P500 fra aar 2000 og frem kan findes her:
https://www.multpl.com/s-p-500-price-to-book
I sit forord til artiklen skriver Carol Loomis forresten noget, der i retrospekt er lidt tankevaekkende/pudsigt:
"Nevertheless, the piece turned out to be wrong in several ways." ... "Second, Buffett misjudged the course of corporate tax rates, which he thought were "unlikely" to fall. In reality, a succession of tax cuts beginning in 1979 brought the marginal rate down from the 48 percent prevailing when the article was written to 35 percent today."
Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything, 1966-2012
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/14461754-tap-dancing-to-work
Bogen er et sammendrag af artikler fra Fortune; 13 af dem skrevet af Warren Buffett. Den foerste af slagsen fra hans haand er artiklen:
"How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor"
Artiklen kan hentes her:
https://fortune.com/2011/06/12/buffett-how-inflation-swindles-the-equity-investor-fortune-classics-1977/
Artiklen er fra maj 1977. I artiklen optraeder foelgende paragraf:
"Must we really view that 12% equity coupon as immutable? Is there any law that says the corporate return on equity capital cannot adjust itself upward in response to a permanently higher average rate of inflation? There is no such law, of course. On the other hand, corporate America cannot increase earnings by desire or decree. To raise that return on equity, corporations would need at least one of the following: (1) an increase in turnover, i.e., in the ratio between sales and total assets employed in the business; (2) cheaper leverage; (3) more leverage; (4) lower income taxes; (5) wider operating margins on sales."
Det gjorde mig nysgerrig ift til at sammenligne med nutidens tal. Derfor har jeg plottet foelgende for S&P500 (jeg beklager, at jeg ikke kender alle ordene paa dansk):
0) ROE (egenkapital-forrentning)
En del hoejere end dengang; ~12% mod ~15,7%. Men hvorfor? Se plottene nedenfor.
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/ROE/sp500_ROE_sumTrue_2020-1.png
1) "an increase in turnover"; asset turnover
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/assetTurnover/sp500_assetTurnover_sumTrue_2020-1.png
2) "cheaper leverage"; renteudgifter ift gaeld
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/debtInterestRate/sp500_debtInterestRate_sumTrue_2020-1.png
I oevrigt naevner Buffett perifert/sporadisk forsynings-selskaberne i denne sammenhaeng, saa jeg plottede dem for sig:
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500_utilities/debtInterestRate/sp500_utilities_debtInterestRate_sumTrue_2020-1.png
3) "more leverage"; equity multiplier
"More leverage? American business already has fired many, if not most, of the more-leverage bullets once available to it. Proof of that proposition can be seen in some other Fortune 500 statistics: in the 20 years ending in 1975, stockholders' equity as a percentage of total assets declined for the 500 from 63% to just under 50%. In other words, each dollar of equity capital now is leveraged much more heavily than it used to be."
Nu er vi helt neede paa 33%. Equity multiplier er den reciprokke vaerdi; aktiver divideret med egenkapital.
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/equityMultiplier/sp500_equityMultiplier_sumTrue_2020-1.png
4) "lower income taxes"; jeg har ikke plottet den effektive skatteprocent, men vi ved alle, at satsen blev saenket fra 35% til 21% ifm Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Om det var en god ide paa lang sigt kan man saa vaere enig eller uenig i.
5) "wider operating margins on sales"
"Recent statistical evidence, furthermore, does not inspire confidence in the proposition that margins will widen in a period of inflation. In the decade ending in 1965, a period of relatively low inflation, the universe of manufacturing companies reported on quarterly by the Federal Trade Commission had an average annual pretax margin on sales of 8.6%. In the decade ending in 1975, the average margin was 8%. Margins were down, in other words, despite a very considerable increase in the inflation rate."
Margenerne er noget hoejere end dengang; sikkert som foelge af tilblivelsen af mange teknologi-virksomheder:
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500/operatingMargin/sp500_operatingMargin_sumTrue_2020-1.png
Jeg har plottet for industri-virksomhederne alene:
https://www.midgardfinance.com/plot/fundamentals/_/sp500_industrials/operatingMargin/sp500_industrials_operatingMargin_sumTrue_2020-1.png
Buffett naevner i artiklen book value:
"It is also true that in the real world investors in stocks don't usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book; usually, however, they've had to pay more than book, and when that happens there is further pressure on that 12%."
Book value har nok mindre relevans i dag end dengang, men K/I for S&P500 fra aar 2000 og frem kan findes her:
https://www.multpl.com/s-p-500-price-to-book
I sit forord til artiklen skriver Carol Loomis forresten noget, der i retrospekt er lidt tankevaekkende/pudsigt:
"Nevertheless, the piece turned out to be wrong in several ways." ... "Second, Buffett misjudged the course of corporate tax rates, which he thought were "unlikely" to fall. In reality, a succession of tax cuts beginning in 1979 brought the marginal rate down from the 48 percent prevailing when the article was written to 35 percent today."
